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LOREN G. STERN
be utilized in the most efficient manner. The pri-
mary advantage of the assigned counsel system
appears to be the participation of a large per-
centage of the bar in the administration of criminal
justice.
Problems were raised with reference to deter-
mining the eligibility of the defendant. On one
hand it was found that only those defendants
incapable of obtaining competent counsel should
be provided with one, and, on the other hand, an
attorney should be appointed as soon as possible
after arrest so as to allow adequate time for the
preparation of a defense. It was also pointed out
that if the defendant has some available funds or
acquires some during the pendency of the pro-
ceedings he should be required to contribute them
to court or to the appointed attorney.
What about providing counsel for misde-
meanors? It has been shown that no valid dis-
tinction can be drawn between felonies and
misdemeanors merely on the basis of length of in-
carceration. If the defendant is subject to a dep-
rivation of life or liberty, he should be supplied
with counsel.
The Criminal Justice Act is a congressional
recognition of the deficiencies previously found in
the federal system. A number of problems, how-
ever, were encountered here, too, though: namely,
lack of an option for the districts to employ a
defender; lack of provision for an attorney at
collateral proceedings; and the unrealistically low
provision for maximum compensation. The
proposed legislation in South Carolina and Illinois
substantially improve these areas and others. Now
what must be done is for other states to apply this
learning and experience.
ABORTION: REFORM AND THE LAW
LOREN G. STERN
The recent proposals to liberalize the abortion
laws of various states have sparked an emotion-
packed debate of national scope and import. Al-
though this debate is political in nature, it has
taken on strong religious overtones due to the
influence of the Catholic Church which has become
so deeply involved in this debate.
No discussion of abortion laws in the United
States can be undertaken without first reviewing
the English common law and statutory law which
provide the basis for our abortion laws.
Prior to 1803 the common law of England was
that an induced abortion before quickening' was
not a crime. This notion was based upon St.
Augustine's belief that the human embryo was
inanimate for an indeterminable period of time
after conception, but then became animate, after
which the destruction of the embryo was murder
and punishable by death.2 To this theory St.
Thomas Aquinas added the refinement that life is
demonstrated by two actions, knowledge and
movement. He theorized that soul is the first
principle of life in things that live and soul entered
I Quickening is that stage of gestation, usually six-
teen to twenty weeks after conception, when the wo-
man feels the first fetal movement.
2Williams, Tim SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIM-
INAL LAW 150-51 (1957).
the body of the embryo at the time of its first
movement.' Bracton, Aquinas' contemporary,
equated the perceptible movement in the womb
with quickening.4 The concept of quickening led to
the common law rule originated by Coke and
stated by Blackstone that "life... begins in
contemplation of law as soon as the infant is able
to stir in the mother's womb" and that the act of
abortion came only after quickening. 5 Thus
abortion before quickening was not criminal,
while induced abortion after fetal activity was
murder in Bracton's view, but was only a misde-
meanor to Coke. 6 An exception to the rule forbid-
ding abortion after quickening developed rapidly
in the common law; if the abortion was done in
order to save the life of the woman, it could be
done at any period of the gestation, it was not
deemed criminal and therefore it was not punish-
able at common law.
In 1803 the first English statute on abortion,
the Miscarriage of Woman Act, abolished the
common law rule that the unlawful act of abortion
came only after quickening. The Act condemned
3Id.
4 Id. at 152.
6Id.
7 43 GEo. 3, c. 58 (1803).
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the willful, malicious, and unlawful use of any
medical substance when used with the intent to
induce abortion, without regard to whether the
attempt was successful or whether the woman
survived. It was a felony in all cases, but punish-
able by death only if the medical substance was
given after quickening.8 Thus a distinction between
abortion before and after quickening was recog-
nized, and a much greater punishment meted out
to those attempting abortion after quickening.
In 1828 the Act was amended to apply to abor-
tions induced unlawfully by use of instruments and
if the woman lived the punishmentwas limited to
three years in prison.9 When Queen Victoria came
to the throne in 1837, the Act was further amended
eliminating all references to quickening and to
actual pregnancy"0
In 1861 the new 'Offences Against the Person
Act' was enacted. This Act is the foundation upon
which our abortion laws are built. Section 58 of the
Act declares the use of any means by a woman,
with intent to effect her own miscarriage, if actually
pregnant, or by others with like intent without
regard to whether she was actually pregnant or
not, to be a felony. Section 59 declares the furnish-
ing of any means effecting abortion with knowledge
that it was intended to be used for such purpose
on any woman, pregnant or not, to be a misde-
meanor." It should be noted that in November,
1965 the English House of Lords voted in favor of
a new abortion statute which would permit
therapeutic abortions to be performed for medical
conditions of the mother, for socio-economic
reasons, for eugenic considerations, and for
pregnancies which resulted from rape or incestuous
intercourse.
1 2
The first state to enact an abortion law was
Connecticut in 1821.11 This statute made it un-
lawful to attempt to abort a fetus by poison after
quickening and was punishable by life imprison-
ment. In 1830 the statute was amended to include
attempts to abort a fetus by means other than the
use of drugs, but these attempts were unlawful
only if done after quickening. 14 30 years later the
statute was further extended to include attempts
8 Quay, Tustiflable Abortion-Medical and Legal
Foundations, 49 GEo. L. 3. 395, 432 (1961).
" O=NCEs AGAiNST TBE PERsoN Act, 9 GEo. 4,
c. 31 (1828).
10 7 WILL. 4 and 1 VicT., c. 85 (1837).
1124 & 25 VicT., c. 100 (1861); See Quay, supra,
note 8 for a complete history.
1270 PARL. DEB., H.L. (11th Ser.) 1139 (1965).
13 CoNN. STAT. tit. 22, §§14, 16, at 152, 153 (1821).
14 CONN. LAWS ch. 1, §16, at 255 (1830).
on any woman, whether she was .,ctually pregnant
or not, with the:intent, to induce abortion. The
punishment was xeduced to one to five years
imprisonment, but more significantly, the statute
made an exception for acts "necessary to preserve
the life of such woman," '5
In 1827 Illinois made any attempt to use a
noxious substance with intent to induce abortion
a crime punishable by imprisonment up to three
years, 16 and in 1867 amended this statute to
include any attempt, regardless of the means used.,
and declared such attempt to be murder if it
resulted in the death of the woman. This amended
statute exempted abortion and attempted abortion
if done "for bona fide medical and surgical pur-
poses." 1
One year later New York. made€ any attempt to
abort a quick child second degree manslaughter if
the intent was to destroy the child or a misde-
meanor if the attempt was only to produce a
miscarriage (not defined) at any stage of the
pregnancy.m The attempt to abort a quick child
was excused if it was necessary to preserve the
life of the mother oT if two physicians had so
advised. In 1845 the New York Legislature dropped
the alternative of allowing two physicians' opinions
and limited the exception"o attempts to abort
only when necessary to preserye the life of the
mother whether before or after quickening.
9
In 1834 Ohio declared any attempt to abort a
pregnant woman unless necessary to preserve her
life, actually or in the opinion of two doctors, to
be a misdemeanor. Any attemptafter quickening
"with intent thereby to destroy such child" was a
high misdemeanor punishable by up to seven
years imprisonment.
20
In 1841 Alabama enacted what had by that
time become a standard abortion statute, forbid-
ding attempts to cause miscarriage by any means
unless necessary to preserve the life of the mother."
It is apparent that most of the early American
statutes distinguished between abortion before and
after quickening. Abortion before quickening was
punished in a lenient manner, while one attempt-
ing to abort after quickening was subject to severe
punishment. Many states made abortion lawful if
16 CONN. PuB. Acms ch. LXXI, §1, at 65 (1860).
16 ILL. REv. CODE §46, at 131 (1827).
'1 Itz. PuB. LAWS §§1, 2, 3, at 89 (1867).
IsN.Y. :Rv. STAT. pt. IV, ch. I, tit. II, §§8, 9, at
550 (1828).
19 N.Y. LAws ch. 260, §§1, 3, at 285 (1845).
20 Omo GEN. STAT. §§111 (1), 112 (2) at 252 (1834).
SALA. AcT ch. 6 §2.
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two physicians were of the opinion that it was
necessary to preserve the life of the woman. But
after a few years' experience, the state legislatures
limited the exception to unlawful abortions to
cases in which the abortion was actually necessary
to preserve the woman's life with no substitution
of a physician's opinion for the fact itself. Most of
these early statutes punished acts done with the
intent to produce abortion regardless of whether
the abortion was actually effected.Y These early
statutes set the criteria and lay the patterns which
are used and followed in nearly all the state abor-
tion statutes today and which have remained
basically unchanged for one hundred years.
Today fifty of our fifty-one jurisdictions make
the procurement or the attempted procurement of
an abortion by any means a possible felony.n New
Jersey, the lone exception, makes it a possible
high misdemeanor.2 The fifty-one jurisdictions are
unanimous in allowing an exception to the law
forbidding abortion. Porty-two jurisdictions allow
abortion if it is done to preserve the life of the
woman. 5 Alabama, Oregon, and Washington D.C.
make abortion lawful if it is done to preserve the
life or health of the woman. 21 Colorado and her
2 Quay, supra note 8 at 437-38.
23Leavy and Kummer, Criminal Abortion: Human
Hardship and Unyielding Laws, 35 So. CAL. L. Rxv.
123, 127 (1962).
24 N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. §2 a:87-1 (1953).2 5 
ARiz. RPv. STAT. ANN. §13-212 (1956); ALAsKA
Comm. LAWS ANN. §65-4-6 (1949); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§41-301 (1947); CAL. PE-CODE §276 (Supp. 1960);
CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §53-30 (1958); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, §301 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. §782.10
(1944); GA. CODE ANN. §26-1101 (1953); HAWAII REv.
LAWS §309-4 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-601 (1948);
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38 §3 (1959); IND. ANN. STAT.
§10-105 (1956); IowA CODE ANN. §701.1 (1950); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §21-410 (Supp. 1959); Ky. REv.
STAT. §436.020 (Supp. 1956); LA REv. STAT. ANm. §88-
6; ME. Rxv. STAT. ANN. c. 134, §9 (1954); Mica. STAT.
ANN. §28:555 (1954); MnN. STAT. §617.18 (1953);
Miss. CODE ANN. 2223 (1956); Mo. ANN. STAT.
559.100 (1949); MONT. Rxv. CODE ANN. §94-401
(1947); NEB. REv. STAT. §28405 (1956); NEv. REv.
STAT. 200.220 (1959); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §585:13
(1955); N.Y. PEN. LAWS 80; N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-44
(1953); N.D. REv. CODE §12-2501 (1943); OKrLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, §861 (1958); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. 11-3-1
(1956); S.C. CODE §16-82 (1952); S.D. CODE §13.3101
(Supp. 1960); TENN. CODE ANN. §39-301 (1955); UTAH
CODE ANN. §76-2 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 §101
(1959); VA. CODE ANN. §18.1-62 (Supp. 1960); WASH.
REv. CODE §9.02.010 (1951); Wis. STAT. ANN. §940.04
(1958); Wyo. STAT. ANN. 6-77 (1957); Omo REv. CODE
ANN. §2910.16 (Page 1954); TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. ch.
9 art. 1191 (1960).2 6 
ALA. CODE tit. 14, §9 (1940), as amended, AcTs
1951, p. 1630; ORE. REv. STAT. §§163.060, 677.010,
677.190 (1959); D.C. CODE ANN. §22-201 (Supp. VIII,
1960).
sister state, New Mexico, permit abortion in order
to save the life of the woman or to prevent serious
or permanent bodily injury to herY Maryland,
a state with a large percentage of Catholics,
surprisingly has the most liberal abortion statute,
permitting abortion by a licensed physician who is
satisfied that the fetus is dead, or that no other
method will secure the safety of the woman and
whose opinion is supported by at least one con-
sulting physician of respectable reputation. 2N
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania have enacted
statutes declaring that an abortion will violate
the statute if done unlawfully25 while New Jersey
requires that the act of abortion be done mali-
ciously or without lawful justification in order to
violate the abortion statute." Obviously the terms
"unlawfully," "maliciously," and, "without lawful
justification" are vague, leaving it to the state
courts to define what these terms mean. The
Supreme Court of Massachusetts has concurred in
the Bourn3 view that an abortion is lawful if done
to preserve the health of the woman.u Although no
Pennsylvania decisions clarify the scope of justi-
fiable abortion, there is dicta to the effect that not
all abortions are unlawful.13 Since the Pennsylvania
statute and Massachusetts statute are similar, and
27 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §40-2-23 (1953); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§40-3-1, -2 -3.
28 M. ANN. CODE art. 27, §3 (1957).
21 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272 19 (1959); PA.
STAT. ANNm. fit. 18 4718, 4719 (1945).
0 
N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. 2a:87-1 (1953).31 Rex v. Bourn, 1 K.B. 687 (1939). The English
Court defined the statutory phrase "for the purpose of
preserving the life of the mother" not only to mean
physical life, but emotional life as well. A woman whose
health is threatened by pregnancy should not have to
be in the jaws of death before an abortion can be per-
formed lawfully, for in any case, the woman's longevity
will most likely be shortened by serious impairment of
her health.
n Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 315 Mass. 394, 53
N.E.2d 4 (1944). The Massachusetts court concurred
in the Bourne interpretation and declared that the
Massachusetts abortion statute allowed abortion in
order "to prevent serious impairment of her health,
mental or physical...." Id. at 395, 53 N.E.2d at 5.
Commonwealth v. Brunelle, 341 Mass. 675, 171 N.E.2d
850 (1961). The court extended their liberal interpreta-
tion of the Massachusetts statute holding that the
burden of proof was on the Commonwealth to prove the
defendant used the instrument unlawfully, that he
acted not to preserve the life or health of the woman,
and that his judgment was in conflict with that of
associated physicians in the community.
Wells v. New England Life Ins. Co., 191 Pa. 207,
43 A. 126 (1899); Commonwealth v. Sindel, 205 Pa.
Super. 355, 208 A.2d 894 (1965). "It was for the jury to
determine whether the attendance of Barbara Feraldo
by Dr. Sindel was lawfully or unlawfully intended."
Id. at 359, 208 A.2d at 896, 897.
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since both statutes have the same common law
background, it is very likely that the courts of
Pennsylvania will interpret the statute to permit
abortions if done to preserve the health of the
woman just as Massachusetts has done. The New
Jersey statute has recently been interpreted to
permit abortion only if it is done to save the life
of the woman.m
This brief review of abortion law in our United
States makes it readily apparent that the major
purpose of abortion statutes is to protect the
mother's life. But the phenomenal advance of
medical science over the last one hundred years
has made it extremely rare to find an illness in a
pregnant woman that cannot be treated so that
her pregnancy can be carried to natural completion
without immediately endangering her life.35
Therefore it appears that very few abortions can
lawfully be performed under our existing laws.
Yet today one out of every four or five pregnancies
in the United States is aborted, totalling over one
million abortions a year.3 6 Proponents of abortion
reform declare that there are other, equally compel-
ling, reasons for permitting abortion. The American
Law Institute's proposed guidelines for abortion
reform embody the basic features of most reform
proposals. The ALI suggests that abortion be
permitted when a licensed physician believes there
is substantial risk that continuance of the preg-
nancy would gravely impair the physical or mental
health of the mother, or that the child would be
born with grave physical or mental defect, or that
the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, or other
felonious intercourse which includes any illicit
14 Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 27 A.2d 689 (1967). After the
Gleitman derision was handed down, Arthur J. Sills,
New Jersey's Attorney General, called a meeting of
New Jersey's county prosecutors in order to draft a
"uniform interpretation" of the New Jersey abortion
law. A committee of four county prosecutors and one
member of Mr. Sills' staff were appointed to draft the
"interpretation". It is probable that the committee will
interpret the statute more liberally than did the court.
This assumption is given credence by the facts that 1)
Sills stated that the committee could retain the court's
interpretation or include others such as when the
mother's health is seriously endangered, when there is a
strong possibility that the child would be deformed, or
if the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest and 2)
the committee chairman is County Prosecutor Brendan
T. Byrne who has never brought criminal charges when
the abortion was performed because the mother had
had German measles.
35 Leavy and Kummer, supra note 23 at 126.
30 Kopp, BIRTH CONTROL IN PRACTICE 222 (1934);
Lader, ABORTION 2 (1966); Leavy & Kummer, supra
note 23 at 124; Niswander, Medical Abortion Practices
in the United States, 17 W. REs. L. REv. (1965).
intercourse with a girl below the age of sixteen.37
These guidelines have met with both hearty
approval and adamant opposition.
Religion has always played a major role in the
American society, thus the stand taken by the
major religious groups on the issue of abortion
reform will exert a strong influence and be an
important factor in determining whether abortion
statutes will be liberalized. In general, the Prot-
estants, who are the largest religious group in the
United States and who comprise a majority of the
population, have come to accept abortion when
the woman's life or health is endangered. Primary
consideration is given to the woman, abortion
being considered "primarily a medical problem for
each family to decide after competent medical and
clerical consultation."1 The majority of the
Jewish community, made up of the Reformed and
the Conservative segments, favor liberalization of
the abortion laws to include abortion in order to
preserve the health of the woman. 9 The viewpoint
of this segment of the Jewish population is sum-
marized in the following statement.
[t]he fetus is part of its mother, and just as a
person may choose to sacrifice a limb of his
body in order to be cured of a worse malady,
so may the fetus be destroyed for the sake of
its mother.' °
The Orthodox Jews are not unanimous in their
attitude toward abortion reform, many condemn-
ing abortion unless performed to save the life of
the woman while others adhere to the view espoused
by the majority of Jewish people."
The Catholic Church does not permit any
Catholic to submit to or commit a direct abortion,
that is, any direct attack on the live fetus, regard-
less of the reason.'1 No condition of pregnancy
constitutes an exception to this prohibition, and
7 'MODEL PENAL CODE, §230.3 & §207.11.
"MODEL PENAL CODE, §207.11, Comment (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1959); TnERAPru~c ABORTION 164
(Rosen ed. 1954); Leavy & Kummer, Abortion and the
Population Crisis; Tlrapeutic Abortion and the Law;
Some New Approaches, 27 Omo ST. L.J. 647 (1966).
9 Cohen, A JEwIsn Vixw TowARD THeRAPEUTIC
ABORTIONS AND RELATED PROBLEMS Or ARTICIAL
INSEMINATION AM CONTRACEPTION 166-173 (Rosen ed.
1954).40Lader, supra note 36 at 97, quoting Rabbi Israel
Margolies.
41Jakovovits, Jewish Views on Abortion, 17 W.
RES. L. REv. 480 (1965).
42Sands, The Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Answer
to the Opposition, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 285; Lader,
supra note 36 at 95 (1966).
1968]
LOREN G. STERN
the punishment for any Catholic taking part in an
abortion is excommunication. The Church firmly
believes that all abortion is immoral even if done to
preserve the life of the woman. Therefore the
Church is opposed to the existing abortion laws,
believing these to be too liberal, and opposes any
further liberalization as morally unjustified and in
complete opposition to the laws of nature.
There are many persons who, while specifically
embracing theological persuasions, oppose abortion
reform on other grounds. An oft-quoted objection
to liberalization of the abortion laws is that
liberalization would encourage illicit sexual rela-
tions, uncontrollable promiscuity, with a resulting
"breakdown in public morality." 4 The obvious
weakness in this argument is that reliance on,
or contemplation of abortion is hardly a factor in
illicit sex in a society where contraceptives are so
readily available. Quick access to contraceptives
renders reliance on the unpleasant and expensive
device of an abortion unnecessary and therefore
unlikely.M Another flaw in this contention is that
90% of all criminal abortions are performed on
married women seeking to avoid the economic
burden of another child,45 indicating that com-
paratively few single girls employ this device as a
means of concealing their illicit affairs.
Opponents of abortion reform argue that
broadening the present laws will lead to under-
population.
46
If our legislatures a hundred years ago were
mainly concerned with American expansion
and the perpetuation of the race, this objec-
tive has been universally nullified. The rational
control, rather than expansion, of population
has become one of the crucial challenges of our
time. Long recognized by local governments,
which have increasingly extended birth-con-
trol services through public-health agencies,
the challenge was reaffirmed in President Lyn-
don B. Johnson's State of the Union message
in January 1965: "I will seek new ways to use
our knowledge to help deal with the explosion
of world population and the scarcity of re-
sources." Two former Presidents,... Truman
4 3Byrn, The Abortion Question: A Nonsectarian
Approach, 11 CATHOLIC LAW 316, 321 (1965); Jako-
bovits, supra note 41 at 494.
"MODEL PENAL CODE, §207.11 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959); Moore, Antiquated Abortion Laws, 20 WAsH:
& LEE L. REv. 250, 256 (1963).
45 Note, The Abortion Law, 12 W. Rs. L. RZv. 74,
84 (1960).46Lader, supra note 36 at 92.
and... Eisenhower, have become co-chairmen
of the nationwide campaign of the Planned
Parenthood Federation.... Obviously, the
vast preponderance of American opinion today
is the diametric opposite of the population
policies of expansion which helped shape our
old abortion laws.0
Still other opponents argue that abortion is
detrimental to the health of the woman.48 This
argument must fall before the force of scientific
studies. The Russian experience with legalized
abortion between 1922 and 193641 yielded statistics
indicating the mortality rate among pregnant
Russian women was less than 0.01%.11 In Sweden,
where there are about 5000 legal abortions per
year, the fatality rate among pregnant women is
about 0.04%.51 This rate is lower than those mor-
tality rates operative in both the United States
and England.n Studies of Japan, which legalized
abortion in 1948, and those Eastern European
countries which provide statistics indicate that
physical after effects of abortion are rare and the
mortality rate is "exceedingly low." 0 Based on
these scientific studies, it is evident that abortion
under optimum conditions involves little risk to
the life or health of the woman.
Many opponents argue that a liberal abortion
statute might be abused by women, who do not in
reality come within its provisions." All proposals
47 Id.
48 Moore, supra note 44 at 256.
49 In 1936 the Soviet government banned legalized
abortion because of the growing threat of Nazi Germany
which convinced Soviet officials that it was necessary
to increase the population in order to replenish the army
and labor force. The ban on legalized abortion was also
due to the fact that the original legalization of abortion
was an outgrowth of the Bolshevik revolution. Thus
Lader contends that the ban on legalized abortion "was
only part of a larger crack-down on the revolutionary
enthusiasm of the old Bolsheviks". LADER, ABORTION
122 (1966). Abortion was again legalized in 1955.
60 Tietze, Induced Abortion and Sterilization as
Methods of Fertility Control, NAT'L Co. ON MATER-
NM HEALT, Publication 27 (1965) at 1152. Out of a
total of 500,000 pregnant women, 6 per 100,000 died
and these deaths were due, in most instances, to other
serious disorders and not to induced abortions.
51 Darby, Abortion, 3 OXuoRD LAW. 10 (1960).
12 Id. The difference in the mortality rate between
Russia and Sweden is due to the fact that the Russian
rules for care after abortion were stricter than those of
Sweden. In Russia the aborted woman would have to
remain in the hospital for at least 3 days and was not
permitted to work for at least two weeks after the
operation.53Tietze, supra note 50; Lader, supra note 36 at
125-31.
14 Moore, supra note 44 at 258.
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for abortion reform declare that it is for the doctor,
the doctor in consultation with other doctors, or a
hospital board of doctors to decide if an abortion is
necessary in each case.55 Therefore, the decision is
not in the woman's hands at all, it is strictly the
doctor's decision based on medical knowledge and
judgment.
The most adamant opponent to and most
influential force against the reformation of abortion
law is the Roman Catholic Church. Although the
Catholic religion is a minority religion in the
United States, it presents a formidable foe because
of its great influence over the Catholic electorate
and the Catholic legislators and because of the
Church's awesome ability to levy pressure upon
our lawmakers. The Church's influence and power
are best exemplified by the recent New York
experience. Albert H. Blumenthal, an Assembly-
man for five years and chairman of the influential
Democratic Advisory Committee, sponsored a
bill in the New York Legislature to reform the
state abortion law. This bill closely paralleled the
reform suggested by the American Law Institute."
Upon learning of this bill, the eight Catholic
Bishops of New York's eight dioceses, in an un-
precedented action, jointly issued a pastoral letter
which was read in all the masses in most of the
state's seventeen hundred churches urging New
York's six and one-half million Catholics to fight
the proposed abortion reform "with all their
power." ' 7 Some church leaders characterized
Blumenthal's position as un-Christian and un-
reasonable." Soon after the reading of the pastoral
letter, Blumenthal was ousted as chairman of the
Democratic Advisory Committee by Speaker of
the Assembly Anthony J. Travia, a Roman Catho-
lic. "According to reliable sources, the main reason
for the dismissal was Mr. Blumenthal's champion-
ing of bills this year to reform the state's 84-year-
old abortion law .... ," 19 Within a month Blu-
menthal's bill for abortion reform was killed in
committee and was never voted upon by the full
assembly. Mr. Blumenthal declared he had always
been ready to discuss a reasonable compromise,
"but all the indications are that nobody is inter-
55 See note 37, Leavy & Kummer, supra note 23 at
140-43; Moore, supra note 44 at 253; Trout, Thera-
peutic Abortion Laws Need Therapy, 37 TEuM. L.Q.
172, 189 (1963); Comment, The Legal Status of Thera-
peuaic Abortion, 27 U. Pixr. 669, 671 (1966).
" MODEL PENAL CODE §230.3 & §207.11.
67 N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1967.
", N.Y. Times, March 7, 1967.
59N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1967.
ested in compromise." 6 0 The Catholic Church, by
applying pressure on the Catholic voters and the
Catholic lawmakers, swiftly and efficiently aborted
the proposed abortion reform in New York.
The Roman Catholic Church's opposition to
any direct abortion6' is historically based upon the
horror of bringing about the death of a child
without the sacrament of baptism, thus depriving
the child of the eternal reward of heaven.6 2 Today
this argument is not used because of the extra-
ordinary dilemmas which it produces.6' The
Church now argues that "[d]irect and voluntary
abortion is intrinsically wrong since it is the direct
killing of an innocent human being." 64 This
argument is based upon the presumption that the
fetus or embryo is invested with a soul from the
moment of conception. The Church has decided
that life begins at the moment of conception and
therefore the embryo is a "person" entitled to all
the rights and protection of constitutional law
normally given to other persons already born-the
right to be born.65
But the Church has not always been opposed to
all direct abortions. There is no doubt that the
Catholic position on abortion has changed through-
out the centuries in order to adapt to the changing
pressures of our ever-changing worlds.6 For eight-
een hundred years theologians have debated over
when the soul first entered the fetus to establish the
60 N.Y. Times, March 7, 1967.
61 The Church allows abortion based on the principle
of "double effect". The termination of pregnancy is only
incident to an operation whose primary effect is good,
but whose secondary effect causes the fetus to abort
without a direct intention of this occurring.
61 The soul of the unbaptized child spends eternity
in limbo where there is no suffering, and no punishment,
but which is void of the divine being.
6Canon 747 prescribes baptism for every living fetus
and conditional baptism if doubtfully living. If the
mother is not aware that she has conceived or spon-
taneously aborts, then the fetus is denied eternal salva-
tion. Another problem presented is the reconciliation
of theology with scientific facts of natural wastage in
embryonic development. One of three fertilized human
eggs or embryos fails to develop correctly and dies in
the uterus, resulting in either a spontaneous abortion
or reabsorption before the fifth week after conception.
Thus if every fertilized egg is considered a life, it must
be baptized. In order to be sure that all fertilized eggs
are baptized, the menstrual flow of every woman having
matrimonial intercourse must be strained to determine
"if there were not some germ there, or, better still, we
ought to pour baptismal water on this blood, taking care
that the water should penetrate everywhere,..
Lader, ABORIoN 101-102.
'A Tinnelly, Abortion and Penal Law, 5 CATHOLIC
LAw 187, 190 (1959).
15 Leavy & Kummer, supra note 38 at 660.
H Id. at 663.
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point at which the fetus died without baptism.Y
For eighteen and one-half centuries the Catholic
Church permitted abortion before the fortieth day
after conception if the child was a male and before
the eightieth day after conception if the child was a
female." And in actual practice, the Church did
not punish abortion unless committed after
quickening. Thus, until 1869 the Church acted in
conformity with the common law.6 9 In 1869 Pope
Pius IX abolished the distinction of abortion
before and after quickening and the forty and
eighty day rules pertaining to males and females.
Pope Pius IX ruled that all direct abortion was
considered murder in the eyes of the Church.
Sixty-one years later Pope Pius XI supplemented
Pius IX's views in his "Casti Connubii" of 1930.
Pius XI condemned all attempts to limit offspring
as acts against nature70 and declared that the lives
of both mother and child (fetus) were equally
sacred, no one, not even the public authority,
having the power to destroy it. Thus the position
which the Church so staunchly and adamantly
supports is a new one, less than one-hundred years
old, and is based solely upon the views of Pope
Pius IX and Pope Pius XI.
The Church's position that life begins at con-
ception is not a scientifically proven fact. In fact,
this premise is the subject of much difference of
opinion.7' It is far from absolute fact; it falls
within the realm of opinion, has been debated for
centuries and is still being debated without resolu-
tion22 The Church's assumption that life begins at
conception is actually only a presumption as
indicated by the following testimony given before
the 1965 California Assembly Criminal Procedure
Committee.
[S]ince no one can say positively when life
begins, the Church maintains that it must
presume that life begins at conception until
proven otherwise. Only in this way can the
Church be sure that the child is protected
from the time life begins, whenever that
occurs. Thus the Canon Law is explicit though
there is no dogma on the point.73
67 Id. See Lader, ABORTION 185 n. 9 (1966).
68 It is unknown how the physician could determine
if the fetus was a male or female.
69 Leavy & Kummer, supra note 65 at 663.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 661.
72 Sands, supra note 42 at 294; Lader, supra note 36
at 95.
7 1962 transcript of the California Assembly Coin-
The Church sincerely believes that the only
satisfactory view is to regard the fetus as being
human from the time of conception. But others,
just as knowledgeable as the Church Hierarchy,
have other opinions as to when life begins. The
philosopher, David Hume, hypothesized that a
human being is merely the sum total of his per-
ception which necessarily involves a memory 4
Since it can not be proven that a fetus has a mem-
ory or is capable of perceiving, it is therefore not a
human being in Hume's eyes. Who can positively
prove that Hume's definition is less valid than that
of the Catholic Church? The writer does not con-
tend that the Church's argument is necessarily fal-
ladous for it is impossible to disprove it. But the
writer earnestly asserts that the Church's position
is no more tenable than that of the proponents of
abortion reform.
It has already been shown that the general
attitude of both Protestants and Jews, easily
comprising a majority of the population of the
United States, is to permit abortions for reasons
other then the preservation of the woman's life.
The only substantial opposition to liberalizing the
abortion laws is the Catholic Church which freely
admits that neither presently, nor in the future, is
there likely to be any scientific proof as to when
life begins. 75 Therefore the leading argument
against reform cannot even be substantiated.
If the state legislators are pressured into ac-
cepting the Church's argument, the criminal law,
which must be enacted with a view toward our
society as a whole, will be governed by the religious
convictions of a minority of the population.
Use of the criminal law contrary to a substan-
tial body of public opinion is definitely alien
to our basic principles, as criminal punish-
ment traditionally has been reserved for
behavior falling below the universally accepted
standards of conduct.
7 6
Even members of the Catholic Church Hierarchy
do not believe that it is the Church's place to
impose its moral beliefs upon the rest of the popula-
tion through criminal statutes. Msgr. George
Casey has stated, "Catholics do not wish to
mittee on Criminal Procedure 124 as cited in Leavy &
Kummer, supra note 65 at 662.74 Hume, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATuRm, Book I,
part IV, section 6.
75 Sands, supra note 42 at 294.76Leavy & Kummer, supra note 65 at 666.
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impose their moral position on non-Catholics." 17
This position was supported by a letter written by
Cardinal Cushing.
There is nothing in Catholic teaching which
suggests that Catholics should write into civil
law the prescriptions of church law, or in any
other way force the observance of Catholic
doctrine on others. Catholics have no right to
do this... while we should make every effort
to see the law upholds human rights and values
and reflects the moral consensus of the com-
munity we should not look upon it as an op-
portunity for promoting specifically religious
teachings, especially when this may be offen-
sive to some citizens.78
Furthermore, if Catholics do not want to avail
themselves of the liberalized abortion statutes,
then they are certainly under no obligation to do
so. Quoting Cardinal Cushing again, "Catholics
do not need the support of civil law to be faithful
to their religious convictions .... "7
The existing abortion statutes are repugnant to
the philosophy of the Catholic Church, yet this
did not prevent the state legislators from passing
these statutes. Once again the legislators are con-
fronted by the moral standards of the Catholic
Church and once again they must not allow these
strict standards to deter them from adopting a
more liberal abortion statute.
The existing abortion laws must be liberalized,
for the fact to be kept in mind is that we are
seeking to preserve the well-being of the woman.
In a recent study of fifty-six women from the
United States seeking abortions in Sweden, only
eight were granted permission to have the abortion.
Of the remaining forty-eight women, twelve ad-
mitted to later abortions performed by physicians
in the United States and Europe which were
undoubtedly illegal. Twenty women were known to
have also procured abortions although where and
by whom was not determined. Thus, out of fifty-
six women seeking abortions, seventy-two percent
(forty women) procured them. And of these forty
abortions, thirty-two were illegally procured.
Only three women carried their pregnancies to
term and all three adopted out the child im-
7 Maisel, The New Battle Over Birth Control, READEas
DIGEST, Feb. 1936, p. 56.
78 Sands, supra note 42 at 296, quoting from a letter
from Richard Cardinal Cushing, Archbishop of Boston,
March 19, 1963.
W Lader, ABORTION 93 (1966).
mediately after birth. The remaining thirteen
women could not be contacted to determine the
results of their pregnancies0 The conclusion
reached by this study is not unusual-if a woman
wants an abortion, she will succeed, even if it
means risking her life.s'
Although the purpose of existing abortion law is
to safeguard the woman, in fact,
[these laws] ... have had an adverse effect on
the mother's health. Although the statute may
on occasion act as a deterrent to the would-be
abortionist, the more usual effect is merely to
drive him underground. The operation is often
performed incompetently and under unsani-
tary conditions. Even more serious is the fact
that patients rarely receive the proper post-
operative care following one of these clandes-
tine operations.82
Today it is estimated that there are over one
million illegal abortions annually in the United
StatesH as compared with eight thousand legal
abortions yearly.84 Kummer and Leavy pose the
question "is society in fact protecting the mother's
welfare by maintaining harsh and unyielding laws
which drive her to unskilled criminal abortion-
ists?" 11 These writers suggest that a lesson can be
learned from the prohibition era when the indirect
9 Rapoport, American Abortion Applicants in
Sweden, 13 ARciVEs or GENERAL PsYcmATRY 24-33,
July 1965.81 Earlier research has also corroborrated this con-
clusion. In a study of 1329 pregnant women, 708 of the
pregnancies were aborted. 93% of these abortions were
criminal. HARPER, P EorMs or THE FAmL (1952).
In another study of 5000 pregnant women, 23% of
these women were aborted. 93.2% of these abortions
were criminal abortions. Gebhard, Pomeroy, Martin,
and Christianson, PREGNANCy, BIRTH, AND ABORTION
54, 93, 196 (1958).
12 Note, The Law of Criminal Abortion: An Analysis
of Proposed Reforms, 32 IND. LJ. 193, 196 (1956).
Lack of space and the everpresent risk of detection forces
the criminal abortionist to require patients to leave his
office as soon as possible after the operation, often
within thirty minutes. Contrasted to this is the five-ten
day rest period deemed absolutely essential by the
legitimate practitioner. Bates, The Abortion Mill: An
Institutional Study, 45 J. CRns. L.C. & P.S. 157, 161
(1954); Taussig, ABORTION, SPONTANEOUS AND IN-
DUCED: MEDICAL AND SocrA Asr crs 171 (1936).
8 Niswander, Medical Abortion Practices in the
United States, 17 W. REs. L. Rxv. (1965); Lader,
ABORTION 2 (1966); Kopp, BIRTH CONTROL IN PRAC-
TICE 222 (1934); Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abortion:
Human Hardships and Unyidding Laws, 35 So. CAL.
L. REv. 123, 124, n. 5(1962).
84 Lader, ABORTION 3 (1966).
"' Leavy & Kummer, Ciminal Abortion: A Failure
of Law, 50 A.B.AJ. 52, 53 (1964).
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evils of the prohibition law far exceeded the evil
at which the law was directed.
In order for abortion legislation to protect the
well-being of the woman, it must force her to have
any abortion performed in a hospital where condi-
tions are safe and medical attention constantly at
hand. It would seem that in order to accomplish
this result, abortion statutes must either be so
liberal as to encompass every situation in which
abortion is desired, or impose such a severe penalty
upon those performing illegal abortions that these
people will be discouraged from attempting them.
But it does not appear that either of these
alternatives alone accomplish complete abolition
of illegal abortions. Studies in Eastern European
countries86 which have legalized all abortion indi-
cate that twenty to forty-eight percent of all
abortions are still illegal ones.n The reason for these
illegal abortions appears to be that both married
and single women dislike news of an abortion reach-
ing their families and friends and, although hos-
pital officials make every effort to disguise the
abortion as some other operation, leaks through
hospital clerks persist." This is especially true in
countries which require that the legal abortion be
performed in the woman's home district.89
Imposing a severe punishment upon those
performing illegal abortions hopefully will deter
many criminal abortionists from performing these
operations. But severe punishment will not drive
all criminal abortionists out of business. No one
believes that he will be caught, and the monetary
reward for illegal abortions makes the risk worth-
while. An analogous situation is that many states
imposing the death penalty on anyone found guilty
of first degree murder. Though the punishment is
the harshest possible, the would-be murderer is
usually not deterred from fulfilling his plans and
murdering his victim.
In order to have a workable and useful statute
which each state could adopt, the abortion statute
must be liberal enough to encompass many of the
situations where illegal abortions now occur,
impose severe penalties upon those attempting to
perform illegal abortions, balance the rights of the
woman against any rights, moral and legal, which
the putative child may have, and still be consistent
with the feelings and beliefs of the majority of the
population.
86The Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Rumania,
and Bulgaria.
87 Lader, ABORTION 129 (1966).
88 Id. at 130.
81 Czechoslovakia requires all legal abortions to be
performed in the woman's home district.
It is suggested that the states adopt the statute
contained in the Appendix of this article. The
purpose of Sections 1 and 2 is to protect the woman
from an unskilled termination of the pregnancy
which will undoubtedly be performed in conditions
that can never begin to approach those provided
in a hospital where only licensed physicians can
practice. The severe punishment of a penitentiary
sentence or possibly death should dull the incentive
of even the most greedy nonphysician abortionist
and hopefully drive them out of business. The
physician, on the other band, who performs an ille-
gal abortion, although probably not done under
optimum, medical conditions, will employ his
medical knowledge and skill to make the operation
a great deal safer than one performed by a layman.
This is a great deal more advantageous in terms of
the woman's health. This conclusion is supported
by the experience of Dr. G. Loutrell Timanus who
performed over fifty-two hundred criminal abor-
tions. There were two deaths among these fifty-two
hundred cases and "Whether these two deaths were
attributable to my negligence or whether they
were incidental, I would find it hard to say." 9 0
None of Timanus' other patients had any serious
after effects of the abortion which required hospital-
ization."
Since the purpose of these sections is the protec-
tion of the woman's health, the necessity of
pregnancy and fetal life is dispensed with in
defining abortion. The dangerous consequences are
inherent in the act of aborting, not in the preg-
nancy.9 2 Where the purpose of an abortion law is
to eliminate the act of aborting, then liability
must be imposed for any act upon a woman when
it is done with the intent to cause an abortion. The
fact that a woman may not be pregnant does not
mean that the chance of infection or hemorrhage
is absent. Whenever any drug is taken' by, or any
instrument is used on, a woman, the chance that
injury will result is ever present; the risk is even
greater if the person performing the abortion is not
a physician. Therefore, these sections contain no
distinction between abortion attempted upon a
pregnant woman and abortion attempted upon a
non-pregnant woman; the danger to each is equally
as great.
Section 3 of the proposed statute does away with
90 Lader, ABORTION 47 (1966), quoting Dr. Timanus
speaking to a medical conference.91 Calderone, ABORTION LAws IN THE UiTED STATEs
62 (1958).
'0 Comment, A Medico Legal Analysis of Abortion
Statutes, 31 So. CAL. L. REv. 181, 191 (1958).
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the distinction made by existing statutes between
the woman's life and her health.
The distinction between saving the mother's
life and preserving her health seems both
tenuous and artificial.... [It is] frequently
difficult to ascertain what constitutes a peril
to life as opposed to impairment of health.. .
It is quite difficult to rationalize why one is
morally acceptable and the other isn't. Therefore,
the law must necessarily take into account the
effect of the pregnancy on the woman as a whole.
The law must consider whether the pregnancy will
leave the woman partially disabled physically or
mentally. It is of great consequence to the woman's
total health whether the bearing of another child
will shorten the mother's life or make the mother
unbearably miserable. A woman's health is not
only determined by the longevity of her years, but
also by the quality of life she leads in her years.
Without minimizing the importance of being
alive, usefulness is of at least equal value, and
that usefulness is based on the combined
mental and physical health of the person. 4
Thus the quality and duration of a woman's life
are dependent upon her present and future mental
and physical well-being. Any serious physical or
mental harm to the mother, who is a human being
subject to pain and suffering, must be avoided if
possible95 and that is exactly what this section of
the proposed statute seeks to achieve.
Consideration of the woman's mental and
physical health involves consideration of the
woman's economic situation for her mental and
physical health is often dependent upon the
economic circumstances in which she finds herself.
The law must take into account whether the
woman is the sole support of herself and her
family; whether she has or can obtain enough
money to live on during her pregnancy; whether
she has other children; whether she lives in an
adequate home; and what effect another child will
have upon each of these circumstances. "A
large, poor family faced with an extra mouth to
feed and a mother not able to work at full capacity
will surely suffer.""8 An increase in the size of the
welfare check will not support this extra child
93 Note, IND. L. J., supra note 82 at 205.
4 Moore, supra note 44 at 254, quoting a California
physician.
95 Id. at 254.
96 Id.
properly. 7 Shouldn't the law consider the mother
and the other young children in this type of situa-
tion?
It is estimated that ninety percent of all crim-
inal abortions are performed on married women
who are in situations of economic distress, or who
desire to maintain a higher living standard." By
considering economic circumstances, this section
encompasses many of the situations in which illegal
abortions are presently performed. 9 The proposed
statute will permit many women who find them-
selves in economic distress to have legal abortions
performed by licensed physicians under optimum
hospital conditions. Thus, the number of situations
in which a woman's health is safeguarded will be
increased with a resultant decrease in the number
of deaths due to illegal abortions. Under this
section the woman's right, the right of a living
person, to lead a full, happy, healthy, productive
life outweighs any right that the fetus, who we
are not sure is living, may have.
It is emphasized that this section does not
encompass those situations in which a woman
seeks an abortion in order to maintain or raise her
standard of living. There is a valid distinction
between the woman who desires to terminate her
pregnancy because she is the sole support of her
family and her pregnancy will prevent her from
adequately supporting her family and the woman
who seeks to terminate her pregnancy because she
wishes to be certain that she will be able to afford
to send her present children to Harvard.
At this point it is noted that the proposed
statute makes no specific reference to termination
of pregnancy in those situations where there is
great likelihood that the child may be physically
or mentally defective. Termination of pregnancy
if the child is likely to be defective will be permitted
under this section only if the bearing of a defective
child will seriously impair the woman's mental or
physical health. Under this section termination
will be permitted in cases where the woman will
suffer severe mental effects if forced to bear a
defective child; or if the woman will find it phys-
ically impossible to care for the defective child; or
if the woman will find herself economically in-
7 id.
'a MODEL PENAL CODE 207:11, Comment 2 at 149;
Comment, The Abortion Law, 12 W. Rs. L. REv. 74,
84 (1960).
91 These estimates do not indicate what percentage of
criminal abortions are performed for economic distress
alone or for raising the standard of living alone. But it
is certain that the desire to have an abortion because of




capable of giving the defective child adequate care.
In cases where there is no severe economic, mental,
or physical distress, the rights of the fetus to be
born outweigh the woman's right to renounce
motherhood. There is always the possibility that
the child will not be born defective, that a miracle
drug will be invented, or that the child will be
rehabilitated and lead a useful life.
Section 4 of the proposed statute permits
abortion for any pregnancy which is the result of
rape, incest, or other felonious assault. Rape and
incest is repugnant to our society. In these situa-
tions society places an everlasting stigma on the
woman and on the child-the product of the
unnatural relationship. In the case of incest the
child can never hope to be legitimatized and in the
case of rape legitimation is very unlikely. The
law should not force a woman to bear the product
of an unnatural relationship nor force her to bear
the child of a rapist, a man she probably does not
know nor will ever want to know. It is unreason-
able to force a woman to bear a child whose crea-
tion was the result of a relationship which the
woman neither desired nor consented to.
Most states have statutes punishing male adults
for having sexual relations with girls under a
specified age even though the girl consented. These
criminal statutes do not punish the girl, presuming
that the girl could not engage in sexual intercourse
because she was incapable of knowing the nature
of her act. This presumption does not mean that
the lawmakers believed every girl under the
specified age was incapable of knowing the nature
of their acts, but it does indicate that the legislators
believe that some girls under this age are truly
naive and therefore the law must be liberal
enough to protect these innocents even though it
means protecting the non-innocents.
The abortion statute is a criminal statute and as
such should be consistent with other, closely
related criminal statutes such as the statutory
rape statutes. Therefore, this section permits the
termination of pregnancy of any girl under the age
specified in the state statutory rape statute. It
would be inconsistent for the law to tell a girl that
she cannot engage in sexual intercourse because
she is incapable of knowing the nature of her acts,
and then, after she becomes pregnant, tell her that
she must face the consequences of motherhood. If
a girl is too immature to understand the conse-
quences of the sexual act, it is difficult to under-
stand how nine months later she will be mature
enough to withstand the possible mental trauma
of an illegitimate birth, and to assume the responsi-
bilities of motherhood. 00 Again it is granted that
many of these girls under the specified age will be
fully capable of being good mothers, but there will
also be those who actually are too naive and too
immature to take adequate care of a child. Forcing
these girls to bear the child is, in reality, punishing
them for the crime of statutory rape.
The task of determining which applicants
deserve abortions falls upon the hospital com-
mittee. The hospital committee is of benefit to the
physician, the patient, and the court. When a
physician is confronted with the decision of
whether to abort, his decision rests upon his own
interpretation of the law and his own judgment.
Just as each person differs, so shall each physician's
interpretation of the abortion law differ. Thus a
doctor may find himself faced with criminal
prosecution because his interpretation of the law
did not conform to that of the public authority.
The committee will relieve the physician of this
burden, thereby ending his fear of criminal prose-
cution. The committee is personally disassociated
from each case, giving the committee "a broader
perspective and an objectivity not attained by the
physician personally involved in the individual
case." 01 These committeees will develop a body of
law, using their previous decisions as precedents,
which will, over a period of time, provide a general
basis for the interpretation of abortion statutes.'0'
The committee will be made up of an obstetrician,
a gynecologist, a psychiatrist, a sociologist, and a
lawyer who will determine through their judgment
as experts whether the woman's condition warrants
abortion for mental, physical, or economic reasons
and whether this abortion will be legal.
CONCLUSION
Today there are over one million illegal abor-
tions annually. The proposed statute will cut
deeply into this astronomical figure by legalizing
abortion in many situations where illegal abortions
presently occur and by making the punishment for
performing illegal abortions extremely severe.
Although the proposed statute may be termed
liberal, it is simply an attempt to keep an important
area of criminal law up to date with our ever-
changing society. The statute is based upon
rational foundations which conform to the desires
of the majority of the United States' population.
100 Sands, supra note 42 at 300.
101 Calderone, supra note 91 at 123.
102 Id.
[Vol. 59
